La Corte Suprema dell’Irlanda ha rigettato la questione di legittimità costituzionale sollevata in riferimento alla previsione legislativa che vieta l’assistenza al suicidio.
Irlanda - Corte Suprema - Fleming case: il divieto di assistenza al suicidio non è in contrasto con la Costituzione
29 aprile 2013
Numero
[2013] IESC 19
Anno
2013
Il ricorso era stato presentato da una donna affetta da una grave forma di sclerosi multipla che la rendeva incapace di muoversi autonomamente. La richiesta della donna era volta ad escludere la responsabilità di chi avesse intenzione di aiutarla a porre fine alla propria esistenza.
La norma contestata è quella contenuta nella Section 2(2) del Criminal Law (Suicide) Act, 1993:
«(2) A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the suicide of another, or an attempt by another to commit suicide, shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years».
La norma ha depenalizzato il suicidio e prevede al co. 4 che «No proceedings shall be instituted for an offence under this section except by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions»
In particolare, con il ricorso, la donna chiedeva:
«(i) An order declaring that section 2, sub-section (2) of the Criminal Law (Suicide) Act, 1993, is invalid having regard to the provisions of the Constitution.
(ii) An order declaring that section 2, sub-section (2) of the Criminal Law (Suicide) Act, 1993 is incompatible with the State’s obligations under the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
(iii) In the alternative, an order directing the Director of Public Prosecutions, within such time as to this Court shall seem just and appropriate, to promulgate guidelines stating the factors that will be taken into account in deciding, pursuant to section 2, sub-section (4) of the Criminal Law (Suicide) Act, 1993, whether to prosecute or to consent to the prosecution of any particular person in circumstances such as those that will affect a person who assists the appellant in ending her life».
Il fondamento del ricorso era stato individuato nella previsione costituzionale del diritto alla vita (art. 40.3.2.).
La Corte si chiede se il riconoscimento del diritto alla vita in Costituzione possa comportare, come corollario, «the right of every citizen to terminate his or her life and to have assistance in so doing».
Pur riconoscendo la sostenibilità da un punto di vista argomentativo di tale possibilità, secondo il giudizio della Corte «it is not possible to discern support for such a theory in the provisions of the Constitution, without imposing upon it a philosophy and values not detectable from it».
L’ostacolo principale al riconoscimento di un simile diritto riguarda l’azionabilità dello stesso: «A right which extends to the termination of life must, as counsel for the appellant recognised in closing submissions, necessarily extend to a right to have life terminated by a third party in a case of total incapacity». «When it is considered that recognition of such a right implies correlative duties on the State and others to defend and vindicate that right (and which must necessarily restrict those parties’ freedom of action), it is apparent that the right contended for by the appellant would sweep very far indeed».
Determinante risulta inoltre il fatto che «it may be impossible to consider the position of the appellant without also having regard to the position of other persons, not necessarily in exactly the same position as the appellant, whose right to life may also have to be taken into account».
In conclusione sul punto:«In the social order contemplated by the Constitution, and the values reflected in it, that would be the antithesis of the right rather than the logical consequence of it».
La questione solleva delicate problematiche di principio e di applicabilità pratica, ma la Corte non esclude un possibile intervento sul punto da parte del Parlamento.
«Nothing in this judgment should be taken as necessarily implying that it would not be open to the State, in the event that the Oireachtas were satisfied that measures with appropriate safeguards could be introduced, to legislate to deal with a case such as that of the appellant. If such legislation was introduced it would be for the courts to determine whether the balancing by the Oireachtas of any legitimate concerns was within the boundaries of what was constitutionally permissible».
In riferimento al principio di uguaglianza sancito dall’art. 40 Section 1 della Costituzione irlandese, la Corte nota che la disposizione legislative contestata è apparentemente neutrale e si applica nello stesso modo a tutti i soggetti dell’ordinamento: «No one who commits suicide commits a crime. Any person, without any distinction, who aids, abets, counsels or procures another person to commit suicide, commits an offence». E’ dunque arduo «succeed in an equality challenge to a law which applies to everyone without distinction, and which is based on the fundamental equal value of each human life» essendo difficile sostenere che la legge «treats her unequally (…) by failing to include a distinction in a facially neutral statutory provision addressed to those other persons, which, she claims, indirectly affects her».
Anche in riferimento al principio di uguaglianza «While it may be open to the Oireachtas to consider making some distinction between persons, it cannot be said that any such distinction is required in this case by the Article 40.1 rights of the appellant».
Per quanto riguarda l’incompatibilità tra la previsione nazionale e l’art. 8 della Convenzione Europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo, la Corte Suprema richiama la giurisprudenza della Corte EDU nel caso Pretty v. United Kingdom (Application No. 2346.02), in cui si stabilisce che «States are entitled to regulate activities which are detrimental to the life and safety of persons» e che «it was primarily for the States to assess the risk and likely incidence of abuse if the general prohibition on assisted suicides were relaxed, or if exceptions were to be made».
In conclusione, il ricorso è rigettato «[a]s there is no right to commit suicide so issues, such as discrimination, do not arise; nor do values such as dignity, equality, or any other principle under the Constitution, apply to the situation and application of the appellant».
Nel box download il pdf della sentenza.
Marta Tomasi
Pubblicato il: Lunedì, 29 Aprile 2013 - Ultima modifica: Martedì, 04 Giugno 2019
